The 13 March issue of the New Yorker has a long feature on nuclear terrorism, which describes some of the amateurish efforts made by Al Qaeda operatives in the past, including Dhiram Barot, a Hindu Briton who had converted to Islam and was sentenced to forty years' imprisonment in London late last year for plotting terrorist attacks:
Charles Ferguson is a former nuclear submarine officer trained in physics; he left the Navy for a career in security studies and is currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2003, he co-wrote an unclassified report titled “Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks.” About two years later, F.B.I. agents working on an international terrorism case asked to meet with him. They brought a document showing that some of his report had been downloaded onto the computer of a British citizen named Dhiren Barot, a Hindu who had converted to Islam. Barot, it turned out, had been communicating with Al Qaeda about a plan to detonate a dirty bomb in Britain, and he had used a highlighting pen on a printout of Ferguson’s study while conducting his research.
The report described how large amounts of certain commercial radioactive materials might pose a danger to a terrorist who tried to handle them. “This seems to have worried him,” Ferguson told me, referring to Barot, “so he decided to look at smoke detectors.” Some detectors contain slivers of americium-241; the isotope’s constant emission of radiation creates a chemical process that screens for smoke. Barot informed his Al Qaeda handlers that he was thinking about buying ten thousand smoke detectors to make his bomb. In fact, to make a device that would be even remotely effective, Ferguson said, he would have had to buy more than a million
I doubt that we can rely on such incompetence keeping us safe in the future, which is why America and ports around the globe - even harbours in Sri Lanka - are now being rigged with radiation detectors - and nuclear weapons specialists being mobilised routinely to protect high-value targets and investigate suspicious people and objects, "a global nuclear-detection architecture"
New technology is already being adapted for defending the homeland against nuclear attack:
“Today, if you’re looking for a neutrino from a pulsar in the next galaxy,” he said, a scientist “can detect one event per year and reject the millions of background events.” The goal of new defense research, he continued, should be to bring “advanced technologies out of the academic community” and learn how to apply them at border posts and truck stops. It should be possible, Wagner said, by way of example, to detect the dull signature of highly enriched uranium by spraying out other kinds of radiation, perhaps from an aircraft, and then search for an echo, roughly the way sonar works—an approach that’s likely to create health problems for civilian populations. Even if that difficulty could not be overcome, he continued, such technology could be useful in enemy territory if it was necessary to do a quick search for hidden nuclear bombs. Indeed, Fred Iklé told me that the Pentagon is now conducting this sort of research.
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